This article examines how organisational designs develop by proposing a novel theoretical framework that views organisational change as resulting from a dialectic process between interpretive agents. The key claim is that existing formal procedures (such as recruitment processes, our empirical focal point) are subject to involved actors' interpretive efforts. This results in a bargaining situation based on the interpretations of the principal actors, which may induce a feedback loop whereby the original procedures are amended. The empirical relevance of the theoretical argument is illustrated via a case study of the hiring procedures in the European External Action Service.
Introduction


Max Weber viewed bureaucratic structures as 'a rationally designed tool, deliberately structured and restructured in order to improve the ability to realize externally determined goals' (Olsen 2006: 12; Weber 1978) . This purported importance of formal structures has instigated extensive research on organisational design and the dynamics of institutional and organisational change (Wendt 2001; Olsen 2006; Buhr 2012) . Institutional entrepreneurs are therein often viewed as key protagonists (Battilana et al. 2009; Murdoch 2012) , and recent work analyses both the enabling and temporal conditions under which such actors drive institutional change (Buhr 2012).
Little attention has, however, been given to the nature of institutional entrepreneurs' activities. While we are gaining a fair understanding of whether and when institutional entrepreneurs are able to instigate change, less is known about how they do so. One important exception is Maguire and Hardy's (2006) study on institutional entrepreneurs' use of discourse, which argues that such actors engage in a 'discursive struggle' to shape
institutions. Yet, this contribution fails to take into account that 'between the context and response is the interpretive actor' (Scott 2008: 78; March and Olsen 1998) . In this article, we therefore focus on institutional entrepreneurs' interpretive efforts. We argue that these represent a key antecedent to any use of discourse because actors 'bring different interpretations regarding the 'rules of the game' into their interaction' (Bezes and Lodge 2007: 131; Emirbayer and Mische 1998) . As a result, we maintain that institutional change results from a 'dialectic' process between 'interpretive agents' (Bell 2011: 884) .
More specifically, our theoretical argument starts from the claim that although existing institutions 'largely determine the context of the action', they nonetheless remain subject to 'the pressures and manipulations of the actors' involved (Crozier and Friedberg 1980: 18-19) . Agents' interpretive efforts thereby play a key role (Czarniawska and Sevon 1996; Bell 2011) . Such efforts not only determine agents' understanding of existing institutions, but also cause existing institutions to be 'actively transferred and translated' (Sahlin and Wedlin 2008: 219) . Different agents can thereby form varying interpretations, leading the original institutions to become effectively 'diverted from [their] original intention' (Crozier and Friedberg 1980: 18-19) . The ensuing diversity of opinion results in a bargaining situation -or 'discursive struggle' (Maguire and Hardy 2006: 7) -based on the 'perceptions, motivations, positions, power, and manoeuvres of [the] principal players' (Allison 1969: 690) . It is this 'ongoing struggle over meaning' that induces institutional development (Maguire and Hardy 2006: 8; Schmidt 2008; Saurugger 2013) .
Although the main aim of this article lies in refining the theory of institutional change, the arguments brought forward clearly have empirical implications regarding the wayand why -the rule definition of important decision processes in any organisation evolves over time. The theoretical argument is therefore empirically illustrated via a case study of one specific international organisation (IO): i.e. the European External Action Service (EEAS).
1 The EEAS -formally established by Council decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 to assist in the governance of the European Union's foreign policy, and operational since January 2011 -provides an interesting test-case. It is not only one of the most important institutional innovations in EU foreign policy governance, but also remains a novel service in full development (e.g. the first internal review of its functioning took place in 2013; Ashton 2013). This is important because the inherent ambiguities and uncertainties related to any new and complex institutional framework open up space for the contestation of existing practices and the influence of strategic actors (Weiss 1982; Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Adler-Nissen 2014) . Moreover, its 'interstitial nature spanning various organizational fields' makes the EEAS a 'carrier of ambiguity' in and of itself (Bátora 2013: 609) , which creates further room for interpretive efforts.
The empirical focus lies on EEAS' recruitment procedures for personnel from member states' diplomatic services for three reasons. Firstly, recruitment processes are important for any organisation's internal functioning and decision-making, since they determine the profile of its officials and thereby shape the basic features of, and preferences embedded in, its decision-making behaviour (Meier and Nigro 1976; Murdoch et al. 2014a) . 2 Hence, all actors involved are likely to have a strong desire to influence them (see, for instance, David [2007] for an excellent study of member states' strategic interference in the recruitment processes of international bureaucrats). Secondly, recruitment processes, especially in the developmental stages of any organisation, remain open to adaptation (Weiss 1982) . Consequently, they provide a setting particularly conducive to the study of incremental institutional change. Finally, recruitment processes by construction involve multiple actors who closely interact, and are likely to develop strategies for attaining outcomes that best serve their interests (Weiss 1982; Johnston 2005 The article makes the following contributions. First, from a theoretical perspective, it elucidates how institutional change can arise from a 'dialectic' process between 'interpretive agents' (Bell 2011: 884) . Second, it adds to our understanding of institutional entrepreneurship by highlighting the importance of agents' interpretive efforts in how institutional entrepreneurs broker change. Third, from a policy perspective, it provides new insights into the EU's changing approach towards foreign policy in everyday practice (Hocking 2002; Duke 2002; Diez et al. 2011) .
A theory of institutional development
A basic tenet of sociological institutionalism holds that institutions are not created by social engineers or intentional designers, but are socially constructed (Gooding 1996) . In such view, institutional development has been argued to critically depend on 'interpretive agents [who] interact dialectically with institutions and wider structural contexts' (Bell 2011: 884; Crozier and Friedberg 1980) . This closely resembles the idea, raised in the bureaucratic politics approach (Allison 1969; Durbin 2007) , that public policies can be viewed as the 'outcomes of various overlapping bargaining games' based on the 'perceptions, motivations, positions, power, and manoeuvres of [the] principal players' (Allison 1969: 690) . In either case, the activities of strategic actors as interpretive agents -understood as 'institutional entrepreneurs' (Battilana et al. 2009 ) in the former literature, and 'policy entrepreneurs' (Buhr 2012) in the latter -become of prime concern.
One approach to modelling agents' interpretive efforts in more detail is provided by the theory of organisational translation (Czarniawska and Sevon 1996; Sahlin and Wedlin 2008; Røvik 2012) . Inspired by Callon (1986) and Latour (1987) , this theory highlights the 'dynamic aspects of circulating ideas' (Sahlin and Wedlin 2008: 219) and the active role therein of organisational actors. More specifically, agents' interpretive efforts can be understood as translation processes whereby an idea is first 'translated into abstract representations' (Røvik 2012: 6 ) -referred to as the transferred knowledge constructand then subsequently fitted into the target domain. As this target domain is unlikely to be a tabula rasa, the imported construct is liable to induce some degree of (prior) deinstitutionalisation (in the sense of Oliver 1992; Dacin and Dacin 2008) . This directly implies that the degree and form of agents' interpretive efforts will, at least in part, be determined by the antecedents and predictors of deinstitutionalisation processes. These include political pressures (that reflect 'a political response to changing power Because agents' interpretive efforts determine their actions and discourses, they are critical precursors of the 'discursive struggle', which induces institutional development (Maguire and Hardy 2006: 8; Bezes and Lodge 2007; Schmidt 2008; Saurugger 2013) . This is most easily illustrated by unpacking the process of institutional change into three closely connected stages: interpretation, interdependence and recursiveness (see figure   1 ).
______________________
Figure 1 about here
In the first stage, agents interpret (or 'translate') existing organisational structures or practices. As mentioned, this stage depends on the presence of certain antecedents of deinstitutionalisation processes, which may occur 'both within and beyond the organization' (Oliver 1992: 566) . For instance, functional pressure towards deinstitutionalisation of existing practices is likely to arise whenever their benefit is perceived to weaken or disappear. This may be due to increased competition for limited resources -such as, for instance, competition over a restricted number of advertised posts in a recruitment setting -which forces organisational members to be innovative. It might also be linked to changes in the organisation's environment that 'discredit or challenge the utility of the operating assumptions of organizations' (Oliver 1992: 574) . Whatever the underlying reason, such circumstances provide institutional entrepreneurs with an instrumental motive to reinterpret existing practices. Similarly, political pressure towards deinstitutionalisation is likely to build up when intra-organisational consensus for given practices declines. This can arise, for instance, when the distribution of power shifts within an organisation (Oliver 1992 (Franzese and Hays 2008: 747) . This, in turn, generates pressure towards copying one another's actions (Geys 2006; Franzese and Hays 2008) . Although different agents may copy each other following a strategic evaluation of such action (a mechanism known as 'strategic emulation'), it is important to stress here that copying need not involve rational costbenefit, means-end calculations. It can also arise as a means of 'adapting to uncertainty prior to any detailed ends-means calculation of the benefits of doing so', known as 'mimicking' behaviour (Johnston 2005 (Johnston : 1021 . The absence of cost-benefit calculations makes such 'mimicking' conceptually distinct from rational emulation, and also implies that the second stage of our model does not necessarily impose full rationality on the part of the agents involved.
Clearly, interdependence requires that different agents become aware of each other's interpretations. Hence, the interdependence of the translation process is more likely to arise in dense networks, as these allow institutional entrepreneurs to navigate more swiftly the flow of information within and between institutions (Crozier and Friedberg 1980) and 'facilitate (…) diffusion of institutional norms' (Oliver 1992: 578; Bell 2011 (Johnston 2005 (Johnston : 1024 . Moreover, it can also be expected that emulation processes (whether strategic or via mimicry) are directed towards the interpretations of particular actors, while ignoring those of others. In studies of spatial public policy interdependence, for instance, stronger effects are generally observed for jurisdictions sharing a border, or lying within a certain distance from each other (Geys 2006; Franzese and Hays 2008) , because such close neighbours are more likely to add 'political pressure' due to their higher influence or perceived 'criticality' (Oliver 1992: 571) . More generally, it may be expected that frequent (in)formal interactions heighten the likelihood of strategic emulation or mimicry (Johnston 2005) .
Finally, the third stage in the process of institutional change consists of a feedback loop from the interpretive agents back to the original institution. This can be referred to as the recursiveness of the translation process. That is, an idea originating in A that appears transformed in B might, in turn, affect the original idea in A. Clearly, this 'return' travel need not occur directly from B to A. More indirect routes are possible, and even probable. The key issue, however, is that ignoring such feedback loops is only valid under the assumption that translation processes from A to B and from B to A are perfectly symmetric (in the sense that a transformation that occurs during the travel from A to B would be perfectly undone during the travel from B to A). Such assumption makes sense within standard diffusion theories since no change in the transferred construct is assumed to occur, and any potential feedback loop thus becomes conceptually irrelevant (Rogers 1983; Ashworth et al. 2006) . It is, evidently, much less innocuous when transformations are allowed to occur.
Crucially, it is in this final stage that various agents' diverse interpretations meet in a 'discursive struggle' (Maguire and Hardy 2006: 7) , which can 'change the institutional status quo in some shape or form' (Reed 2004: 415) . Evidently, such feedback loop again requires awareness of diverse interpretations (see above). More important, however, is that some degree of openness to change should exist not only in B, but also in A. Should the latter not be the case, a feedback loop will be unlikely to materialize, and an overly 'innovative' interpretation on the part of any agent could become counter-productive.
Furthermore, the characteristics of the interpretive agents co-determine the likelihood of a successful feedback loop. For instance, the presence of actors with high bargaining power might augment political and/or social pressure towards deinstitutionalisation and organisational change. The institutional status quo is thus more likely to be challenged when interpretive agents have a higher degree of legitimacy (Weiss 1982 ).
An application to recruitment procedures in the EEAS
The theoretical framework set out in the previous section suggests a number of empirical implications. In this section, we illustrate some of these by applying our model to the development of the recruitment procedures in one specific international organisation The focus on the 'Proof of diplomatic credentials' is driven by two facts. On the one hand, this 'Proof' represented a fundamental requirement advanced by the EEAS, such that the analysis deals with an issue central to the studied recruitment process. In effect, it also reflects the fact that personnel from member state diplomatic services are hired by the EEAS to represent EU-level interests in terms of foreign policy (like diplomats), rather than administer these policies (like bureaucrats). On the other hand, the ambiguous nature of the requirement (discussed in more detail below) makes it a natural choice to analyse the dialectic process between interpretive agents (Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Røvik 2012 ).
Decision-making within international organisations (IOs) such as the EEAS generally comes about as the result of 'continuous bargaining between governmental delegates
[and] the international organisation's bureaucracy' (Reinalda and Verbeek 2004: 19) .
This includes decision-making on recruitment processes, as witnessed by David's (2007) study of member states' strategic interference in the recruitment processes of international bureaucrats. In line with this general observation, linkages with, and agreement from, member states' officials are also imperative to the EEAS' functioning.
This not only refers to member states' officials taking a proactive role in 'uploading' their specific foreign policy preferences (Balfour and Raik 2013), but also contributing 'ideas and views' on the further development of the EEAS' internal organisation (Ashton 2013:
2). The governance and design specificities of the EEAS thus provide a natural environment for assessing the theoretical micro-foundations of organisational change, and further specifying key concepts of our theoretical model (summarized in figure 2 ). candidates succeeding, and thereby helps to safeguard one's influence over EU foreign policy. Such influence over 'the way in which the international bureaucracy works and to steer it in certain directions or to prevent other countries gaining increased influence' is generally considered an important objective of member states in IOs (Trondal 2010: 251) .
In our specific setting, especially officials from larger member states with long diplomatic traditions and a central position in the European Union -that arguably face a more 'imminent threat of failure or obsolescence' (Oliver 1992: 570) in light of the EEAS' establishment -might be more likely to opt for flexible interpretations of existing recruitment procedures.
Within stage 2 of the theoretical model, an incentive to copy others' interpretationswhether as a result of strategic cost-benefit calculations or due to non-strategic mimicry (see above) -is likely to arise because only one person can be hired for a given job (Johnston 2005; Geys 2006; Franzese and Hays 2008) . As suggested earlier, the interdependence between actors' interpretations within this stage is likely to depend on the composition of, and different actors' positions in, social networks. From this perspective, one might expect officials from large, prestigious, leading EU member states acting as potential role models or reference points. The reason is that their actions might be more likely to increase 'political pressure' on officials from other member states given their higher influence or perceived 'criticality' (Oliver 1992: 571) , and may be viewed as a more 'authoritative source of interpretation' (Hobolth and Martinsen 2013: 1412) or as 'legitimis[ing] similar behaviour in other nations' (Weiss 1982: 295) . Equally, networks based on historical or geographic ties between countries might support more frequent, informal meetings of their officials -and thereby ease information transmission, as well as increase the likelihood of strategic emulation or mimicry.
Finally, with respect to stage 3 of the theoretical model (i.e. feedback effects), a broader interpretation of EEAS' recruitment procedures can only be beneficial when the EEAS accepts (at least in part) this new interpretation. As this depends on the bargaining power of the actors involved (see above), officials from large, prestigious EU member states may again play an important role here because their bargaining power is likely to be higher (Tallberg 2008; Bailer 2010) . As such, their actions might add more political and social pressure on the EEAS. Moreover, their actions may achieve a higher degree of legitimacy in the eyes of other actors (Weiss 1982) .
Data and methodology
The empirical analysis exploits information from two main sources. First, we employ official documents related to the staffing of the EEAS. These include, but are not limited to, the minutes of the core group of the Consultative Committee on Appointments (CCA) -which meets periodically to assess EEAS' recruitment procedures -and the EEAS Before turning to the results, it is important to mention two generic concerns regarding qualitative research based on interviews. The first relates to the risk that respondents provide politically correct views. This is especially likely for questions regarding the activities of their own institution in potentially sensitive areas -as is here the case. To address this, respondents were not only asked about the activities of their own institution, but also about those of other institutions involved in EEAS' recruitment process. This increases the internal validity of the dataset by providing the opportunity to cross-validate the obtained information. Further cross-validation was introduced using information from official documents and media sources (see above). The second common concern is that interview quotes might have been strategically selected to sustain the argument. The analysis below therefore followed a data reduction strategy in which the interview transcripts were coded and categorized in several rounds by the first author -with crossvalidation by the second author -to increase the reliability of any inferences drawn from the material. This strategy enables the discovery of broad patterns and common themes in the answers of various respondents. We then linked these patterns to the theoretical model to verify its empirical implications, and introduced direct citations from the interviews merely as illustrative examples (though we admittedly selected quotes that best illustrate a given point).
Empirical analysis
The empirical analysis consists of two parts. First, we discuss why the notion of diplomacy can be viewed as a 'transferred knowledge construct' in the hiring procedures for personnel from member states' diplomatic services in the EEAS. Then, the following three sub-sections assess recent developments in these hiring procedures in light of the three stages of the process of institutional change set out above. It is important to observe here that our unit of analysis does not concern member states themselves, but public officials representing them (see also below). In contrast to the statist ontology in much Crucially, therefore, the EEAS' broad task-portfolio and ambitions, as well as the diverse structural and procedural demands inherent in the 'multistakeholder' diplomatic framework of the EU diplomatic system (Hocking and Smith 2011) complicate an unambiguous reading EEAS' requirement for 'diplomatic credentials'. It indeed implies that 'diplomacy can be reinterpreted outside the state-centred script of traditional diplomacy' (Hocking and Smith 2011: 27) . This is confirmed in our interviews. Due to the lack of guidelines provided by the EEAS (Interviews 4, 6, 7, 19; CCA Committee 2012), bringing up the 'Proof of diplomatic credentials' in the interviews often generated responses indicating a clear interpretive effort: e.g., ' We really understand that…'
(Interview 5), 'For us it means that…' (Interview 7), 'We would interpret it as…'
(Interview 10), 'That means, from our point of view…' (Interview 13). It follows then that within our theoretical framework, diplomacy can be seen as the knowledge construct embedded in the requirement for 'diplomatic credentials'. The latter provides an important indication regarding what member states' officials perceive as core and ancillary elements of the diplomatic tradition. Indeed, since the core elements of any given tradition are likely to be very enduring and resistant to change (Shils 1981; Dacin and Dacin 2008) , any 'editing' takes place by emphasising relevant, and downplaying less suitable, ancillary elements within this tradition (Shils 1981) . In the deinstitutionalisation literature, such adjustment 'at the margin' is known as 'dilution' (Dacin and Dacin 2008: 346) . Allowing relevant experts without direct foreign policy experience, but with some international experience, into the pool of applicants for posts within the EEAS (see above), can be seen as one such dilutive effort. It does not affect the core symbols and rituals involved in diplomatic work, but it broadens the group of government officials that can be involved in such practice by 'editing out' the need for pure foreign policy experience.
One could argue that these varying views of 'diplomatic credentials' merely reflect variation in the understanding of 'diplomacy', rather than a true interpretation of the EEAS' recruitment requirement. Two pieces of evidence suggest, however, that this is not the case. First, officials in big member states with a substantial diplomatic tradition - 
Stage 2: Interdependence
Stage two of the process of institutional development holds that the interpretive efforts of different actors will be interdependent (see figures 1 and 2). A key pre-condition for such interdependence is that member states' officials are aware of the differences in their
approaches. This appears to have been the case since 'comparing notes and exchanging information (…) about the process' occurred frequently among the officials of smaller groups of countries (Interview 16; also Interview 19). 12 More often than not, and in line with findings from studies of spatial policy dependence, such groups reflected close geographical and/or historical links (Interviews 3, 5, 7, 12, 16, 23, 24) . These networks exploited 'a mutual interest in pooling knowledge and ideas' (Hocking and Smith 2011: 29) , and the EEAS' application process became 'definitely one of the issues which are usually on the agenda during our bilateral talks' (Interview 5; also Interview 18, 20).
Moreover, several other discussion fora were employed to exchange information, such as the regular COREPER meetings 13 and irregular informal meetings of (representatives of) the Secretariats-General of the member states' MFAs (Interview 6, 20, 21) . In line with the theoretical model's stress on the importance of network density and composition in this stage of the process, this suggests that the extent of these (in)formal networks allowed institutional entrepreneurs to navigate the flow of information within and between institutions (Crozier and Friedberg 1980) and helped to 'facilitate (…) diffusion of institutional norms' (Oliver 1992: 578; Olsen 2003 18). This appears to have been particularly true for officials from small and new member states (e.g., Latvia, Slovakia, Estonia, Bulgaria), who were initially more restrictive in their interpretations (see above). Some also explicitly admitted that they initially 'didn't know how to approach it to be honest' (Interview 15), which left significant space for imitative behaviour. This confirms our theoretical proposition that novices within an existing network are more prone to strategic emulation or mimicry (Gheciu 2005; Johnston 2005 ).
Even so, there is no clear indication that officials from specific member states arose as opinion leaders. Most 'followers' seem to have built on what they perceived to be the dominant interpretation in their environment, rather than follow the lead of, say, officials in member states with a larger, more prestigious diplomatic service. Only one respondent indicated that a broad view of diplomatic credentials was employed in the country's MFA because 'he made a research and he found that the British Foreign Office used the same procedure' (Interview 29). This goes against the idea that interpretive efforts of officials in prestigious, leading EU member states may add 'political pressure' given their higher influence or perceived 'criticality' (Oliver 1992: 571) . 15 Rather, it appears that closeness in terms of historical and/or geographic ties -for instance, between Austria, Hungary and Slovakia (Interview 1, 4, 24) -was critical as it supported more frequent, informal meetings and easier information transmission (see above).
One potential explanation for the latter observation may be that large and small member states in the EU have different demands from, and preferences with respect to, the EEAS (e.g., in terms of consular matters or crisis management; Avery, 2012; Jarc, 2012), and face different challenges in terms of their 'resource make-up and ability to be present in places around the world' (Persson, 2012: 419; Bicchi, 2012; Wlachovsky, 2012) .
Officials from smaller member states may thus more closely identify with one another, which is important given the significance of 'prior identification' for imitative behaviour (Johnston 2005 (Johnston : 1022 . Another explanation may be that officials from smaller member states simply aimed to follow what was perceived as the most successful approach, rather than any particular leader. Such 'voluntary imitation of a superior model' conforms to the idea that 'receivers copy an organisational form because of its perceived functionality' (Olsen 2003: 512; Oliver 1992) , which is closely related to the fact that strategic emulation and mimicry at least in part reflect 'survival behavior' (Johnston 2005 (Johnston : 1024 . Two further elements then pushed towards a readjustment of the EEAS' application requirements. First, the interpretive efforts of member states' officials created a substantial force against the status quo, particularly since officials within the big member states applied a lenient interpretation (see above). This created significant political and social pressure on the EEAS to officially adjust its recruitment requirements (Oliver 1992) . Second, the regular occurrence of formal and informal meetings between (Interview 20). 16 As a result, the broader interpretation that had gained ground became institutionalised (whereas the narrow interpretation became further de-institutionalised) at the level of the EEAS. The EEAS in effect 'modified' its existing practices by 'mixing them with the new knowledge construct' that had developed among member states' officials (terminology from Røvik 2012: 22) . This is consistent with the view that institutional change derives from a struggle over meaning whereby 'new discourses do not neatly supplant legacy discourses, but, instead, are made to overlap' (Maguire and Hardy 2006: 7) .
Concluding discussion
Recent theoretical and empirical research has given institutional entrepreneurs a key role in analyses of institutional and organisational change (Battilana et al. 2009; Buhr 2012; Murdoch 2012 ). This literature concentrates on whether and when institutional entrepreneurs' involvement is imperative, but pays little attention to how they do so. In this article, we aimed at refining the theory of institutional change by highlighting how institutional entrepreneurs' interpretive efforts can influence the rule definition of important decision processes within an organisation. The key argument thereby entails that institutional change results from a 'dialectic' process between 'interpretive agents' (Bell 2011: 884) . Using a unique new dataset, we assess this theoretical framework on the EEAS' recruitment procedure for personnel from EU member states' diplomatic services.
Our empirical results provide substantial empirical support for the theoretical framework:
(i) EEAS' recruitment criteria were interpreted in different ways by member states' officials, (ii) member states' officials copied each other's interpretations, and (iii) EEAS' selection procedures adjusted to these interpretations. Interestingly, the adjustments made by the EEAS to its vacancy notices started another interpretation process among member states' officials as it created 'a lot of questions all over Europe' (Interview 20; also Interview 3, 28) and left ample room for interpretation (Interview 7, 14, 15, 16, 19) . As there currently is a consensus that all IOs are not alike, it is important to keep the specificity of the analysed organization in mind. Most generally, there are important differences between organizations of integration (such as the European Union and its institutions and services) and organizations of cooperation among states (such as the United Nations). Moreover, the EEAS is de facto a fairly independent service of the European Union, and its mission is to define and defend a European foreign policy (while keeping in mind sovereignty of the member states). From this perspective, it is important to observe that, using secondary data sources, results in line with those obtained from the EEAS dataset are shown to hold also with regard to UN member states' personnel policies (Weiss 1982) , and the Europeanisation of EU member state public policies (Martinsen 2005; Hobolth and Martinsen 2013) .
These findings are important beyond their theoretical contribution. From a policy perspective, studying changing recruitment processes provides one way to elucidate shifting objectives and aims of organisations (and its members). The reason is that hiring procedures directly affect the profile of any organisation's officials and, as such, critically shape the basic features of ensuing decision-making patterns (Meier and Nigro 1976; Murdoch et al. 2014a ). This also holds in the diplomatic field, such that 'who is -or should be -involved in [diplomacy] and what forms and practices it should assume' becomes a fundamental question for any diplomatic service (Hocking et al. 2012: 9) .
Consequently, this study's findings help understand the European Union's changing approach towards foreign policy. This holds particularly in an era when 'the institutions of diplomacy (…) have to work with a growing community of stakeholders' and when 'diplomacy is becoming the business of managing networks' (Hocking et al. 2012: 9) .
Consequently, the changing recruitment practices of the EEAS appear to reflect a 'process of innovation in the diplomatic field' (Bátora 2013: 609). (Weiss et al. 2009 ). As the individuals whose recruitment practices we study are supposed to represent EU-level interests in terms of foreign policy, and not member states' interests, this locates them under the second pillar. Still, it should be observed that they are diplomatic staff, and not bureaucrats in a strict sense (see also below). Moreover, while not crucial to the analysis below, successful applicants remain
NOTES
Member State officials since their positions are set up as temporary posts (for maximum 10 years), upon completion of which the official's home institution is required to reintegrate him/her among its staff. Note also that MFAs could exploit their role as providers of this critical document to influence which of their staff were able to apply. Murdoch et al. (2014a) as well as Duke and Lange (2013) indicate that at least some Member States effectively take up this role as 'gatekeepers'. 6 Due to time constraints, two respondents provided written answers to the questions in the interview guide. 7 The recruitment of Member State officials was organised within the rotation system through which EU officials change post on a regular basis (Europa.eu 2010) . Note also that although the EU had no embassies prior to the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the Commission maintained 'representations' in 136 countries. With the Lisbon Treaty's ratification, these were transformed into EU 'delegations' (i.e. embassies).
9 Similar interpretive efforts occur with respect to personnel-related issues in other IOs. Weiss (1982) , for instance, discusses the introduction of an oath of office including a 'pledge of international loyalty' in the League of Nations in 1932. The US State
Department then undertook 'a complete study', and decided that this oath 'was not a pledge of allegiance, but simply a declaration of loyalty and therefore compatible with the dictates of citizenship' (Weiss 1982: 296) . This indicates a substantial interpretive effort with respect to the wording of this oath. Martinsen (2005) shows that our argument extends also beyond personnel issues. In April 1998, the European Court of Justice ruled that national healthcare services should be extended to migrant workers. Martinsen (2005 Martinsen ( : 1042 shows that in response to this ruling the Danish government 'revised its interpretation of 'service'' such that 'the vast majority of Danish healthcare services fell outside the definition' implied by the ruling.
10 Their more flexible interpretation may, however, be seen as a 'functional necessity' (Oliver 1992: 581 14 Interestingly, recent work by Hobolth and Martinsen (2013) highlights a similar network-driven interdependence in the interpretation of EU rules by the national bureaucracies responsible for their implementation. Transgovernmental networks (TGNs) 'composed of sector-specific experts' are indeed shown to play a central role in 'the development of shared understandings' (Hobolth and Martinsen 2013: 1411) . 15 It also goes against Weiss' (1982: 297) observation that within the United Nations in the 1970s 'other nations inevitably attempt to copy the United States or Soviet Union' (i.e. the two major contributors to the UN budget at the time) in terms of the personnel policies they imposed on their UN representatives. 16 Referring once more to Weiss' (1982) 
